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Abstract
We evaluate the role that cities play on individual productivity in China. First, we
show that location explains a large share of nominal wage disparities. Second, even after
controlling for individual and firms characteristics and instrumenting city characteristics,
the estimated elasticity of wage with respect to employment density is about three times
larger than in Western countries. Land area and industrial specialisation also play a signif-
icant role whereas the access to external markets does not. Therefore, large agglomeration
economies prevail in China and they are more localised than in Western countries. Third,
we find evidence of a large positive impact of the local share of migrants on local workers’
wages. Overall, these results strongly support the productivity gains that can be expected
from further migration and urbanisation in China.
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Introduction
The 6th National Population Census conducted in China in November 2010 portrayed a
rapidly urbanising country, with the urban population reaching 49.7%, an increase of 13.5 per-
centage points compared to the 2000 Census. A large share of this above-expectation increase
comes from the massive rural-to-urban migration that dramatically accelerated in the 2000s1,
in sharp contrast with strictly controlled population mobility prevailing in earlier decades.
Urbanisation in China has long been highly regulated, in part by means of policies that lim-
ited rural-to-urban migration through the dual urban-rural resident system of the Hukou, a
distinctive feature that imposes strong administrative barriers to migration. Restrictive poli-
cies towards urbanisation translated into a relatively low urbanisation rate and the dominance
of small or medium-sized cities over large cities (Xu, 2009). Unlike many developing countries
that experienced a rapid urbanisation process, China successfully avoided many problems
associated with the development of mega-cities, including slums, urban poverty, criminality,
and social unrest. However, the restrictive policy towards urbanisation also came at a cost,
in terms of capturing the benefits from urban agglomeration. In a recent report, Henderson
(2009) argued that there were ‘too many cities with too few people’, with China lacking cities
of 1-12 million inhabitants. In 2007, only 3 out of 286 prefecture-level cities had more than
10 million inhabitants, 10 had 5-10 million inhabitants, 39 had 2-5 million inhabitants and
118 had 1-2 million inhabitants (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). With one billion people
expected to live in Chinese cities by 2030, the country now faces extremely challenging policy
choices in the management of the expanding urban population, the provision of adequate
urban infrastructure and public services, and the securing of public safety and social stability.
Yet, the unprecedented pace and scale of urbanisation can also be seen as an opportunity to
sustain economic growth by capturing agglomeration economies. This paper aims at assessing
the magnitude of such productivity gains from agglomeration and the role migration plays in
the process.
The standard explanation provided by economic geography for the positive impact of ur-
ban scale on labour productivity is based on a series of agglomeration effects including pure
knowledge spillovers, the sharing of inputs, and the pooling of the labour force2. Though
negative outcomes of agglomeration are often stressed, the empirical literature generally con-
cludes, from Ciccone and Hall (1996), to a positive overall impact of the size of the local
economy on local productivity. Yet, most empirical studies focus on developed countries,
and somewhat surprisingly, there is very little evidence on the magnitude of agglomeration
economies for developing countries, though many of them are witnessing dramatic changes in
1Rural migrant workers are estimated at 153 million in 2010, a rough doubling over the decade.
2See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a thorough review on the micro-foundations of these effects.
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economic growth and regional inequality.
This paper contributes filling the gap by testing the presence of agglomeration economies
in China. The following research questions are empirically explored: What is the magnitude
of the gains from concentrating economic activities over space in China? To what extent does
internal migration contribute to these effects through a separate impact on local residents’
productivity? To answer these questions, the separate role of the city density, land area,
industrial specialisation and diversity, access to other cities and city share of migrants on
wage differentials across urban workers is estimated.
We proceed in three steps. We first introduce city-level fixed effects and some other
localisation effects in a standard individual wage equation and assess their relative explanatory
power; we then explain these fixed effects by incorporating city-level characteristics into the
analysis; we finally incorporate in the model an externality arising from rural migration. As
detailed in Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008a), the estimation of agglomeration economies
raises a number of specific methodological issues, which we consider here. First, workers
may sort spatially depending on personal characteristics (e.g. their abilities), which generally
affects their labour outcome. If this is the case, it may be difficult to identify separately the
role of agglomeration economies and the role of the workers’ characteristics on their wage. As
pioneered by Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) and generalized by Combes, Duranton and Gobillon
(2008b), the literature suggests to use individual data to address the issue, a strategy we
follow here. Second, the estimation of agglomeration economies is almost inevitably plagued
by a reverse causality bias. Large locations increase the productivity of firms, and therefore
workers’ wages, but higher productivity and wages also attract more firms and more people
(if they are sufficiently mobile) in cities, which in turn increases the city size. This issue is
addressed in the paper through an instrumentation strategy detailed in section 2.3.
Few contributions on China relate to our approach. Au and Henderson (2006) and Xu
(2009) estimate agglomeration economies on real output per worker, while Hering and Poncet
(2010) structurally estimate an economic geography model through trade and wage equations.
Using aggregate data for 205 prefecture-level cities in 1997, Au and Henderson (2006) estimate
a bell-shaped function of real output per worker against city scale and conclude that more
than half of the cities in their sample are significantly undersized. In a similar vein, Xu (2009)
uses a panel of 155 Chinese cities from 1990 to 1997 and finds clear evidence of agglomeration
effects, the optimal city size being estimated at four to five million persons. However, the
use of aggregate data prevents both papers from addressing the possible selection bias due to
the presence of more skilled workers in cities or the fact that while firm productivity gains
in cities directly translate into wages in a perfectly competitive setting, it may not be the
case in China. Using individual wage data, as done here, enlarges identification possibilities
and clarifies the direction of causalities. Hering and Poncet (2010) use individual data for the
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year 1995 but they focus on the impact of aggregate market access and do not specifically
study the role of cities. Furthermore, all the aforementioned papers use data from the mid-
1990s3. Over the last decade, China has been experiencing both huge growth rates and
institutional changes, typically regarding mobility that is at the heart of the phenomenon
we study. Both may have significantly affected the distribution of economic activities and its
impact on local economic outcomes, wage inequality among others. By using data for the year
2007, we provide an updated overview of the determinants of spatial wage inequality and we
simultaneously assess the specific impact of migration on local productivity, which none of the
above-mentioned papers do. Regarding the latter point, Meng and Zhang (2010) is the only
paper we found that tries to specifically evaluate the impact of urban migrants on natives’
labour market outcomes in China but it does not emphasise the geographical dimension of
local labour markets (e.g. role of local employment density, area and market access). Section
2 provides a comparison of the different strategies used in the literature and highlights our
original approach to specify the simultaneous impact of both geography and migration.
We find that location matters for productivity in China. Being located in a twice-denser
city increases wage by 8.7%, even after controlling for individual and firms characteristics
and instrumenting city characteristics. This is about three times larger than what is usually
estimated for Europe or North America with similar specifications. Hence, further produc-
tivity gains could result from increasing the size of Chinese cities. Land area and industrial
specialisation are also found to play a significant role. Conversely we do not find any robust
evidence of an impact of the access to markets outside the city. These findings indicate that
agglomeration economies are more localised in China than there are in Western countries:
the own-city density matters more, as do own-area and the city specialisation, whereas the
size of neighbouring cities matters less. Finally, regarding migration externality, we find ev-
idence of a positive and significant impact of the local share of migrants on local workers’
wages, which does not substitute much to other agglomeration gains. For instance, keeping
the number of local workers constant, if new migrants move to a city so that their share in
total employment jumps from the first quartile (decile respectively) of the distribution across
Chinese cities to the last quartile (decile respectively), productivity in the city increases by
10.0% (32.0% respectively). Two-third of the increase result from the externality exerted by
migrants and one third results from agglomeration effects induced by the increase in total
employment generated by the migrants inflow.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the data sources and
provides summary statistics on spatial wage differentials in China in 2007. Section 2 presents
3Hering and Poncet (2009) study Chinese regional wage differences over a more recent period (1995-2002)
in the same framework as Hering and Poncet (2010). However, their analysis relies on province-level data,
which deeply reduces the possibility to control for individual characteristics unevenly distributed over space.
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the empirical strategy followed in the paper. Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss the step-by-step
econometric results and the estimated magnitude of urbanisation and migration externalities
in China. Section 6 concludes.
1 Nominal wage dispersion across cities
1.1 Data
The data used are drawn from two main complementary sources: 1) individual data ex-
tracted from the 2007 Urban Household Survey conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS), and 2) city-level data compiled from the annual volume of the China City
Statistical Yearbook published by the NBS in 2008. Additional data used in sections 4 and 5
come from the 1% 2005 China Population Census and from historical maps.
The raw individual database from the 2007 Urban Household Survey comprises 10,318
households and 30,340 individuals. Only urban Hukou holders are surveyed, which excludes
an important segment of the urban labour market composed of rural migrants not officially
registered in cities. With the number of migrants representing about 17% of China’s 1.3 billion
people, migrants constitute an important group to be reckoned with, yet clearly marginalized.
Lacking the same status as city dwellers, migrant workers face major inequalities in cities.
They are denied equal access to public services and to job opportunities; they face poor and
unsafe working conditions; and they work primarily in the informal sector (Cai, Park and
Zhao, 2008; De´murger, Gurgand, Li and Yue, 2009). Our database being restricted to urban
Hukou holders only, the observed wage disparities refer to urban residents (‘natives’) only
and one cannot infer that the wage determinants across Chinese cities we identify here would
equally apply to migrant workers. Nevertheless, in an effort to assess the possible role of
migrants on urban labour productivity, we estimate the externality they exert on local urban
workers simultaneously with agglomeration effects, as explained in section 2.2.
Our sample is restricted to individuals aged 16 to 70, who declared working at least part
of the year and earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are
excluded because we cannot disentangle wages from profit in their case. Taking into account
these restrictions, we are left with 14,590 workers4.
The earnings variable is the declared income from wage employment, which includes the
basic salary as well as all sorts of bonuses, allowances and subsidies (including housing or
medical subsidies), other wages (including overtime wages), and other income from work unit.
The main drawback to the NBS data is that no working time is recorded, which does not
4The discrepancy with the total number of observations in the raw database is primarily explained by the
age pyramid and the occupational distribution of the population. In the original database, 53% are working
individuals, 19% are retired (mostly above the age of 50), 4% are unemployed or waiting for a job, 20% are
students (mostly below the age of 16), and 4% are full-time home-makers or others.
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allow us either to separate part-time and full-time workers, or to estimate an hourly wage
model. Given this constraint, we focus on total earnings from the work unit reported by
wage workers who declared strictly positive annual earnings. To check the robustness of the
estimated effects, section 4.2 supplements the analysis with a database for the year 2002 that
documents individual working time and thus enables us to compute hourly earnings.
City-level data come from the China City Statistical Yearbook 2008. The administrative
structure in China comprises four levels. In 2007, the mainland territory was divided into
31 province-level regions (excluding the two Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and
Macao), 333 prefecture-level regions (including 286 prefecture-level cities), 2,859 county-level
regions and 40,813 township-level regions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). The 87 spatial
entities studied here are prefecture-level cities that can be considered as metropolitan areas
by international standards, i.e. the city and suburban districts (excluding counties under the
jurisdiction of the city government). Any prefecture has at most one such metropolitan area.
Unfortunately, not all provinces in China are represented, but only 16 of them5. Yet, Kernel
density estimations for the distribution of employment density, respectively for all prefectures
in China and for the 87 prefectures of our sample, highlight pretty close distribution patterns,
as illustrated in Appendix A. Medium-sized cities tend to be slightly under-represented while
very large ones are slightly over-represented. However this should not bias our estimates
and, if anything, under the standard assumption of diminishing marginal gains from city size,
agglomeration economies should be only underestimated.
1.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the prefecture-level cities in our sample. The average
size of cities is rather large (2,297 square km), with however important differences across
urban areas as reflected in a coefficient of variation of 1.35. The largest metropolitan area is
Chongqing municipality (26,041 square km), which also hosts the largest urban population in
China (15,3 million). The smallest area in our sample is found in Shanxi province, with a city
area of only 147 square km. The average employment density is 414 workers per square km,
with again large dispersion across cities. The ratio of the ninth to the first decile is 36.9 and the
coefficient of variation equals 1.03. To illustrate this geographical dispersion, Figure 1 maps
the distribution of employment density across the 87 prefecture-level cities. Unsurprisingly,
denser areas are found in coastal provinces, but Figure 1 also highlights pockets of densely
populated (in terms of employment) areas in inland provinces, such as in Shanxi or Hunan
provinces.
5Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong,
Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu. In the original NBS survey, four autonomous prefectures, all in
Yunnan province, are also included. However, since we do not have any information at the city-level such as
area or total employment, for these autonomous prefectures, we exclude them from the analysis.
6
Figure 1: Employment density in the sampled prefecture-level cities
Figure 2: Average wage in the sampled prefecture-level cities
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Table 1: Summary statistics for local variables
Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Employment density 414.2 426.6 25.44 61.76 315.1 665.0 938.1
(workers per sq. km)
log employment density 5.353 1.347 3.236 4.123 5.753 6.500 6.844
Area (sq. km) 2296.8 3098.0 537 835 1623 2718 4225
log area 7.337 0.867 6.286 6.727 7.392 7.908 8.349
Diversity 6.071 1.036 4.553 5.443 6.039 6.840 7.531
log diversity 1.789 0.175 1.516 1.694 1.798 1.923 2.019
Specialisation 0.170 0.0305 0.133 0.146 0.166 0.184 0.220
log specialisation -1.789 0.175 -2.019 -1.923 -1.798 -1.694 -1.516
Market potential 162875 44600 99812 138752 167345 181594 215843
log market potential 11.96 0.288 11.51 11.84 12.03 12.11 12.28
Distance to seaport 521.5 414.6 82.75 179.2 428.0 721.4 1229.2
log distance 5.619 1.733 4.416 5.189 6.059 6.581 7.114
Migrant share 0.285 0.211 0.0842 0.140 0.208 0.361 0.624
log (1-migrant share)−1 0.422 0.540 0.0879 0.150 0.233 0.448 0.978
N 87
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics (2008); 1% Population Census 2005.
Figure 2 displays the average annual wage at the city-level in 2007 for the 87 cities under
study. Huge wage gaps across cities can also be observed, with the ratio of the highest average
to the lowest being above 5. Various inequality indicators computed at the city-level confirm
the wage gap across cities: the coefficient of variation equals 0.36, and the Gini coefficient is
equal to 0.18. In terms of spatial wage distribution, Figure 2 also gives evidence of a clear
coastal-inland gap. Higher wages are paid in Guangdong province (especially in Shenzhen,
the city that borders Hong Kong, where the average annual earnings is above 50,000 yuan).
On the other hand, the lowest wages are paid in inland provinces, such as Wenshan in Yunnan
province. As a first insight on possible agglomeration economies in China, a raw comparison
between Figure 1 and Figure 2 highlights similarities between the distribution of employment
density and the distribution of average wages.
Simple correlations using city-level averages corroborate this observation and reveal a
strong correlation between average city-level earnings and either employment density or em-
ployment level. The estimated elasticities are respectively of about 0.08 with respect to the
former and 0.14 with respect to the latter. As compared to developed countries such as France
(Combes et al., 2008b), the estimated unidimensional elasticities for China in 2007 are higher.
The explanatory power of employment density is more limited yet (with a R2 of about 14%
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against 51% for France), but it is equivalent for total employment (33% against 34%).
2 Empirical strategy
Our general objective is first to evaluate the relative contribution of location as compared
to individual characteristics in the explanation of wage differentials across urban workers,
and then to determine the factors that shape the location effect. This section presents the
framework for the estimation of agglomeration effects, and extends it to introduce a migra-
tion externality. It finally reviews the instrumentation strategy we follow to address reverse
causality and missing variables issues.
2.1 The estimation of agglomeration effects
We start with a simple model that describes our key identification assumptions. Firm j
located in city c (in a given sector not made explicit here) operates under constant marginal
cost (once fixed costs are paid). Its output yj is given by:
yj = Aj k
θ
j (
∑
i
ei`i)
1−θ , (1)
where Aj is the technology level, `i is the number of hours worked by worker i, ei measures
worker i’s efficiency and kj inputs other than labour. Under the assumption of competitive
markets for final goods and inputs, and once logarithms are taken, the first-order condition
for profit maximisation leads to:
logwi = log Φj(i) + log ei , (2)
where wi is the hourly wage of worker i and Φj(i) is a wage shifter for firm j(i) that employs
worker i defined as:
Φj ≡ (1− θ)θθ/(1−θ)
(
pjAj
rθj
)1/(1−θ)
, (3)
with pj the revenue per unit sold (net of intermediate consumption and trade costs, if any,
born on exported units) and rj the cost of kj .
Equations (2) and (3) summarise the key explanations for higher wages in cities. Labour
productivity, which directly translates into nominal wages, is higher in cities where firms
benefit from workers with high efficiency ei, or from pure knowledge externalities that increase
their technology level Aj . Wages are also higher when the access to final goods markets is
good as it implies higher prices net of trade costs pj . Finally, wages are higher when the cost
9
of inputs rj other than labour is low
6.
To get to the estimated specification, we need further assumptions on the determinants of
the two right-hand side terms in (2). We assume that worker i’s efficiency ei is a function of a
vector of her own personal characteristics Ci, and the firm j productivity shifter is a function
of both a vector of its own characteristics Fj and of some local effects. As all possible local
effects cannot be identified because of missing data, the literature usually estimates a two-
equation specification as follows:
logwi = Ci a1 + Fj(i) a2 + Lc(i)s(j(i)) a3 + δc(i) + εi (4)
δc = Uc α+ νc (5)
In a first step, equation (4) isolates the impact of worker i’s and firm j’s characteristics
on individual productivity from the impact of location. Local effects are captured by both a
vector Lcs of agglomeration effects in city c that are specific to the firm’s industry s (the so-
called “localisation effects”) and a city fixed effect δc. The city fixed effect captures both the
agglomeration effects that operate between industries in location c (the so-called “urbanisation
effects”) and the role of any other local characteristic that affects individual productivity (e.g.
local public goods, specific technology or endowment, or local geography). εi is an individual
random component that affects worker i’s efficiency. In a second step, specification (5) explains
the estimated city fixed effect by a vector of observable urbanisation effects, Uc, which includes
employment density.
The vector of individual characteristics that affect productivity, Ci, includes gender, expe-
rience7, education and occupation. Within-the-firm experience is sometimes also considered
but, unfortunately, such information is not reported in the data set we use. Firm j’s charac-
teristics, Fj , include sectoral dummies, which allows us focusing on the spatial variations of
productivity only. In the specific case of China, the ownership of firms is another important
determinant of workers’ wages (Chen, De´murger and Fournier, 2005). We take state-owned
enterprises as the reference group, and we add dummy variables for urban collective firms,
private or individual firms, and “other” firms (including foreign-owned firms).
As for agglomeration effects, Lcs typically includes the role of the sector local size, mea-
sured by the share in the local economy of employment in the firm’s sector. A positive impact
of such a specialisation variable reflects the presence of localisation economies arising for in-
stance from the sharing of specific inputs or labour skills or from the presence of sector specific
knowledge spillovers. Then most agglomeration effects are identified through the second step
estimation. The main variable of interest in Uc is the city employment density. The larger it
6More than the cost of capital, which generally varies little between various locations in the same country,
these effects include the price of land and the cost of intermediate inputs used in production.
7We use the actual number of years of work experience, i.e. participation to the labour force, reported in
the survey.
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is, the stronger technological spillovers, the larger the final goods or inputs markets, the better
the matching between firms and workers, all possible reasons for which employment density
is expected to positively impact productivity and then wages. However, the effect of density
could be also negative if congestion on land or on the local transport network dominates and
reduces productivity. Besides employment density, the city land area is also included in Uc.
Whereas density captures the thickness of the location, land area, once density is controlled
for, assesses over which land surface such a density effect holds. If agglomeration economies
dominate, land area should also have a positive impact on productivity even after control-
ling for density. Moreover, following Jacobs (1969), one may also expect that a diverse local
economic environment can favour innovation and productivity, which is another aspect of ur-
banisation economies. This intuition is usually captured by introducing the inverse of a sector
concentration Herfindhal index, which should as well have a positive impact on productivity.
Beyond the city own characteristics, its location within the network of all other cities may
also matter. Typically, if workers do benefit from the density of their own city, they should
also benefit, though probably to a lower extent, from the density of neighbouring cities since
they most likely interact with them. Economic geography models have emphasised such a
role of the access to distant markets. Empirically, it is usually captured by market potential
variables. We use the Harris (1954) definition, which simply corresponds to the inverse-
distance weighted sum of densities over all Chinese cities other than the city considered.
Following Au and Henderson (2006), we add as another control for the proximity to external
markets the distance to the closest seaport,8 which reflects the access to foreign markets. Some
studies, as Hering and Poncet (2010) for China, use a structural version of market potential,
which makes sense when the purpose is to test whether a particular economic geography
model is valid. The specification we choose here allows us to identify separately the specific
roles of the city own size, the proximity to other large Chinese cities, and the proximity to
foreign markets. Contrary to the assumption made in economic geography models, there
are many reasons to think that the access to these three types of markets has a different
impact on local productivity. For instance, while at short distance, proximity induces gains
from both knowledge spillovers and demand effects, when the distance increases, especially
for international markets, the role of the demand size dominates. From a policy perspective,
it is therefore important to assess these roles separately, and our findings confirm that they
indeed differ9.
8Among the 12 majors coastal seaports in China (defined by the volume of freight handled), which are, by
decreasing order, Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Dalian, Rizhao, Yingkou,
Yantai, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang.
9Harris (1954) market potential is also probably less endogenous from an econometric point of view than
the structural market potential since it is not based on trade flows determinants estimated simultaneously in
structural approaches. In any case, it has been shown that the correlation between the two types of market
potential is very high and that both perform very similarly in regressions (Head and Mayer, 2004). By splitting
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Table 1 reports the summary statistics for all the variables related to urbanisation economies.
Density and land area present the largest spatial variations, as typically observed in most
countries. On the contrary, diversity and specialisation vary little, while spatial variations in
access to external markets are intermediate.
A number of issues must be kept in mind. First, only the total effect of agglomeration
is identified and the effect of spatial concentration on each channel that appears in equation
(3) cannot be identified separately. In other words, as it has been acknowledged in the liter-
ature for long, urban scale may raise wages through a variety of channels (better technology,
higher labour efficiency, higher prices of goods, and lower costs of other factors) but very
few studies to date managed to give their relative importance. Likewise, if agglomeration
induces negative effects, they cannot be identified separately from the positive ones. This
could be the case for instance if competition on local goods markets is tough (e.g. if goods are
not so much differentiated), which would induce prices of goods to be lower in larger cities.
The less tradable the inputs other than labour, or the less mobile their input suppliers, the
more responsive their price is to an increase in demand, which can make them higher in large
cities, as it is true at the extreme for land. Finally, pure congestion effects may also decrease
efficiency. Notwithstanding these caveats, estimating the total net effect of agglomeration is
meaningful in a policy perspective since a positive estimate means that gains from agglomer-
ation dominate losses, and implies that increasing the size of cities for instance would improve
productivity.
Second, the assumption of competitive markets for inputs and final goods may raise some
concerns, especially for an economy like China. However, we only need wages to be propor-
tional to labour productivity, which implies that these concerns should not be too strong. For
instance, if the firms’ monopsony power depends on location, and is typically lower in denser
areas, this is estimated as part of the positive effects of agglomeration (for workers).
2.2 Migration and agglomeration effects
Beyond the estimation of agglomeration effects, a contribution of the paper consists in propos-
ing an empirical strategy to simultaneously assess the extent to which internal migration con-
tributes to Chinese urban residents’ productivity and wages. From the initial contributions
of Sjaastad (1962) and Topel (1986), a pretty large literature has attempted to evaluate the
impact of international migrants on their host country labour markets. This literature pro-
vides contrasted evidence and migrants’ impact on local wages remains a highly debated issue.
While earlier studies concluded to dominating negative effects on natives outcomes (Borjas,
market potential into three distinct variables, our approach identifies more effects, which is very much in the
spirit of what is done by Au and Henderson (2006) (and also by Chen and Partridge (2011) in their study of
the determinants of city growth).
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Friedman and Katz, 1997), more recent contributions are somewhat more optimistic (Card,
2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri, 2012). Importantly, most studies focus on OECD coun-
tries (Docquier, Ozden and Peri, 2011), and in all cases the concern is about international
migration.
Our perspective is different for two reasons: we focus on an urban-level, and not a country-
level, context and we study the impact of labour mobility within the country, i.e. internal
migration. The share of migrants in local employment sharply increased over the last decades
in China10 and some concerns were raised regarding their potentially negative impact on
local residents’ labour market outcomes. As rural migrants are significantly less educated
than their urban counterparts, a major concern is that by increasing the relative supply of
unskilled workers in cities, the inflow of rural migrants would exert a downward pressure
on wages, particularly for unskilled local urban residents. This mirrors similar concerns for
developed countries and international migrants. However, the only existing study we are
aware of for China finds no significant impact of the rural migrant inflow on average wages of
urban workers (Meng and Zhang, 2010). The non-negative impact of migrants on local wages
can find it sources in the presence of complementarities between native and migrant workers.
In that case, the induced positive externality from migrants to local workers may offset the
negative effect due to the increase in (unskilled) labour supply. In what follows, we propose
further exploring this issue by explicitly accounting for the role of internal migration when
estimating agglomeration economies.
We argue that for a correct interpretation of the role of migrants and a consistent discussion
of endogeneity, we need to specify the role of migrants in relation with the way urbanisation
effects are taken into account. As emphasised above, the main focus of economic geography
is on the role of the city total employment density, DenTc , and the specification estimated is
typically the following:
δc = β logDen
T
c + U˜c η + νc, (6)
where U˜c is the vector of urbanisation effects other than density. The literature on interna-
tional migration usually specifies the role of the share of migrants in local employment. A
parallel can be done with the formulation adopted in economic geography when assessing the
externality effects of more educated workers on other local workers (see Moretti (2004) for
instance), which also considers the impact on productivity of their share in local employment.
Under that perspective, one could simply estimate:
δc = β logDen
T
c + λMigShc + U˜c η + c, (7)
10Using the 2000 Census data, Cai et al. (2008) estimate that migrants account for 19.6% of the employment
in China’s cities (excluding townships).
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where MigShc is the share of migrants in total employment. However, such a specification is
difficult to interpret because total density is itself a function of the share of migrants, namely
DenTc =
DenNc
1−MigShc where Den
N
c is the density of native employment. This leads to
δc = β logDen
N
c + β log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ λMigShc + U˜c η + c. (8)
When migrant employment is poorly measured and the city density variable mostly reflects
native employment, the estimation of the migrant externality, λ, is blurred by the fact that
migrants simultaneously shape total employment density. Equation (8) also underlines the role
of the specification adopted for the migrant externality. If one assumes that the externality is
proportional to log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
instead of MigShc, which is in either case ad hoc (and almost
identical as long as MigShc is small), one gets:
δc = β logDen
N
c + (β + λ) log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ U˜c η + ζc. (9)
This specification uses the impact of the density of native employment to identify agglomer-
ation effects and the migrant effect corresponds to the sum of the agglomeration effect and
the migrant externality. Therefore the respective impact of density and migrants is better
disentangled. Given the better measurement of native employment than of migrant employ-
ment in our data, we prefer to report estimates corresponding to specification (9). It is also
preferable for endogeneity concerns as detailed below.
2.3 Endogeneity concerns and instrumentation
OLS estimates for specification (9) can clearly suffer from endogeneity bias. A simple model
of migration consists in assuming that migrants are attracted by higher expected wages in
the city (i.e. a high δc), as well as by other amenities found in dense areas. In other words,
one could specify for instance:
log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
= φ δc + ρ logDen
N
c + ϑc, (10)
where φ is a positive parameter and ρ can be either positive or negative (depending on whether
urban disamenities more than compensate amenities for workers). In that case, one can easily
show that a correlation between log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
and ζc exists, even when logDen
N
c is not
correlated to ζc.
11 Therefore OLS estimates of (9) are biased and one has to deal with such
11Cov
(
log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
, ζc
)
= Cov
(
φδc + ρ logDen
N
c + ϑc, ζc
)
= Cov
(
φβ logDenNc + φ U˜c η + φ (β + λ)
log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ φ ζc + ρ logDen
N
c + ϑc, ζc
)
. Even if we assume Cov
(
logDenNc , ζc
)
= Cov
(
U˜c, ζc
)
=
Cov (ϑc, ζc) = 0, we have Cov
(
log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
, ζc
)
= φ
1−φ(β+λ)V ar (ζc) 6= 0.
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a reverse causality.
Interestingly, acknowledging the endogeneity of migration also allows us to correctly in-
terpret the reduced-form specification (11) obtained when (10) is plugged back into (9):
δc =
β + (β + λ)ρ
1− φ(β + λ) logDen
N
c + U˜c
η
1− φ(β + λ) + ξc. (11)
Though looking similar to (6), this specification leads to a different interpretation of the
elasticity of density, which encompasses both agglomeration economies and the externality
from migrants, and the two can no longer be identified separately. Therefore, one needs to
be careful when interpreting (6) or (11) and make sure that the correct density variable,
either total or native employment, is used. OLS estimates of (11) should also suffer less
from endogenity bias since the migrant variable does not enter explicitly. This is also why
estimating (9) should also be more robust than (7): native density should be less endogenous
than total density.
Economic geography stresses that OLS estimates of agglomeration effects can be biased
non only because of reverse causality between wages and migration but also because of missing
productive amenities in the productivity specification. For instance, dense areas can benefit
from better public infrastructure (e.g. large train stations or airports, universities), which are
in general not controlled for in the specification. In that case, even the native employment
density is correlated to the random productivity component and must be instrumented.12
To sum up, once instrumented, specifications (7) and (9) identify the same parameters but
we expect (9) to lead to cleaner interpretation and to be the easiest to instrument because
there are less elements that make DenNc endogenous than Den
T
c . Equation (11) identifies
one parameter less but also requires to instrument one variable less. Finally, note that most
variables in U˜c depend on local employment and have to be instrumented too on grounds
similar to density. We start by estimating (11) in section 4 as it is consistent with both the
model including the role of migrants and the usual estimations of agglomeration economies
in the literature. Then we move to the estimation of (9) in section 5, which allows us to
emphasise the role of migrants.
To address endogeneity, we take an instrumental variable approach and we use several sets
of instruments as sources of exogenous variation for the suspected endogenous variable(s).
The standard practice since Ciccone and Hall (1996) to instrument for urban size or density
is to use historical variables such as long lags of population density. The rationale is that
the spatial distribution of population is persistent over time but the sources of productivity
differences differ over time. Following this approach, our first series of instruments relates
12A survey of endogeneity concerns when estimating agglomeration economies and solutions implemented
for Western countries can be found in Combes et al. (2008a).
15
to historical data. We use a set of important cities in China at the end of the 19th century,
which is composed of major historic cities, including 48 treaty ports conceded to foreign
countries between 1842 and 192013. Although we do not have historical population, this set
of important cities at the turn of the 20th century can be considered as a relevant instrument
since, as stated by Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2012): “[in] the late 19th and early 20th century,
the Chinese government and a set of Western Colonial powers built railroads connecting the
historical cities of China to each other and to the newly constructed so-called treaty ports”(p.
5). From these historical data, we compute several indicators. First, we use a dummy variable
for cities that are either historic major cities or former treaty ports. Second, we compute a
‘peripherality’ index (the average distance) to these historic cities. We also consider a purely
geographic peripherality index that consists in the average distance of any city to all cities, be
they historic or not. Economic geography shows that “being central” influences productivity
and employment growth. Theory also implies that distance should be weighted by the level of
economic activity, for the same reason as why both local density and market potential variables
are introduced in the specification. This is also the reason why our peripherality instruments
are not weighted. Therefore, they remain correlated with the instrumented variables but
should not be too much correlated with current wages and productivity shocks.
The second set of instruments is borrowed from Au and Henderson (2006), who use 1990
data on city characteristics and amenities. We use the shares of manufacturing and services
respectively in total employment, the share of non-agricultural employment in total employ-
ment and the share of doctors in the population, all measured for the year 1990. The intuition
is that the past industrial composition of the cities should have influenced their total employ-
ment growth. On the other hand, with a twenty-year lag over a period of major reforms in
China, past industrial composition should not be too much correlated with current wages
and productivity shocks. The presence of doctors can reflect amenities or the occupational
composition of overall employment that may similarly have influenced the development of
cities without being correlated to current productivity shocks.
Finally, the third set of instruments is composed of “Henderson instruments” (as defined by
Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2012), which are computed for occupations and for sectors.
The index corresponds to the population that the city would have, would its workers be located
in a city with total employment corresponding to the mean city employment (nation-wide) for
the workers sharing the same occupation (employed in the same sector respectively). More
precisely, for each occupation (sector resp.), we compute the mean city employment. Then
for each city, we compute the instrument by interacting the local share of employment of an
13The treaty ports were part of the ‘unequal treaties’ that China signed with Western countries in the late
Qing dynasty. The system was abolished in 1943 after China signed new treaties with Britain and the US (Jia,
2012).
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occupation (sector resp.) with the mean employment at the city level for this occupation
(sector resp.) before summing across occupations (sectors resp.). Put differently, a city with
a high proportion of managers will be predicted to be large because on average over China,
managers locate in larger cities, while an urban area with a high proportion of blue-collar
occupations will be predicted to be small. This sort of instrument is interesting because it
removes from city size the part that is not explained by its occupation or sectoral structure,
typically the one that could relate to possibly missing variables in the wage equation and
that makes the city actually larger or smaller. Therefore, such instruments should be fairly
exogenous to the wage random component and simultaneously be strong enough because the
employment structure necessarily affects at least part of the city size. Using instruments from
fairly different families should reduce the risk of facing weak instrument issues and give more
credence to the over-identification tests.
3 Individual wages and city fixed effects
We first estimate simple regressions that successively include the different sets of explanatory
variables: location effects, individual characteristics, and firm characteristics. They are first
introduced separately and then combined with each other. At this stage, our interest being in
the relative contribution of the different sets, we do not report the estimation results but only
focus on their adjusted R2, which are reported in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, individual char-
acteristics alone explain 25% of the variations of individual wages in 2007. The explanatory
power of firm characteristics alone amount to 13%. Interestingly, and much less documented
in the case of China, we find that location accounts for a non-negligible share of the variations
in individual wages. Indeed, city dummies and specialisation together exhibit a substantial
explanatory power, with an adjusted R2 of 17%. Another finding worth mentioning is the
fairly strong orthogonality of the three groups of effects. City effects and individual charac-
teristics together explain 41% of wage disparities when the sum of their individual R2 is 0.42,
and 30% for city and firms effects for a sum of their individual R2 at 0.28. Individual and
firms effects are a bit more correlated. As a consequence, the explanatory power of the city
effects cannot be fully attributed to differences in the composition of the labour force and in
the type of firms present in the city.
Table 7 in Appendix B reports a full variance analysis. Its shows that the main fac-
tor explaining individual wage disparities are individual characteristics but location effects
matter also and come second before firms effects. It also indicates that among local effects,
specialisation explains very little of wage disparities. These results closely match those ob-
tained for developed countries. On the other hand, the absence of sorting of workers across
cities in China depending on their skills is corroborated by the absence of correlation between
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Table 2: Explanatory power of various sets of right-hand side variables
Adj. R2 for individual wages in 2007 (log wage) as a function of:
City effects 0.17
Individual characteristics 0.25
Firm characteristics 0.13
City effects and Individual characteristics 0.41
City effects and Firm characteristics 0.32
Individual characteristics and Firm characteristics 0.28
All three sets 0.44
N 14,590
Notes: City effects include both city fixed effects and a localisation effect measured
by sector specialization.
individual characteristics effects and city-level dummies (with a non-significant correlation
coefficient at 0.0012). This is in sharp contrast with what is usually obtained in developed
countries, where a large fraction of the explanatory power of city effects arises from the sorting
of workers14.
To further examine the sorting hypothesis, we run additional regressions not reported here.
The underlying idea of the sorting test is that if individuals were sorted across cities accord-
ing to their abilities, the city-level employment density would be correlated with individual
characteristics such as education or occupation. Hence, one would expect the estimated coef-
ficient for employment density in the second step of the estimation to change when individual
characteristics are not incorporated in the first step wage equation. This is typically what
arises for Western countries, the density elasticity being multiplied by a factor of 2 in the case
of France. As for China, the elasticity of employment density is found to be very stable across
specifications, with and without individual controls in the first step. The absence of sorting
may not be surprising since labour mobility towards urban areas with a change in Hukou has
been strictly restricted for decades and remains controlled15.
Table 3 displays estimation results for the first step specification (4), section 2.1. We
confirm usual findings on the role of gender, education and experience in urban wage settings
in China. Everything else equal, male workers benefit from a wage premium of about 25% as
compared to female workers. The returns to education are slightly above 6% for one addi-
tional year of education and we find the usual concave form for actual work experience, with
14See for instance Combes et al. (2008b) for France where the correlation between individual and location
fixed effects is found to be large, at 0.29. See also Mion and Naticchioni (2009) for Italy and Bacolod, Blum
and Strange (2009) for the US even if the spatial sorting of skills there is somewhat less strong.
15Since our database covers urban Hukou holders only, the sorting hypothesis refers to this part of the urban
population only. Migrants may be included in the sub-sample, provided that they obtained a change in their
Hukou.
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a wage peak achieved at about 24 years of participation to the labour force. As for occupa-
tion, administration staff and professional or technical staff earn a 30% to 36% premium as
compared to the reference category. Regarding firm characteristics, almost all sector dummies
are significant (the reference sector is manufacturing) and have signs consistent with existing
evidence on China. In particular, we find that oligopolistic sectors (such as finance and insur-
ance, public utilities, real estate) pay higher wages than the competitive manufacturing sector.
The impact of ownership variables also corresponds to what is usually found for China, with
higher wages still being paid in the public sector, the reference category (De´murger, Fournier,
Li and Wei, 2007). Finally, the elasticity for specialisation is found at the upper bound of
what is usually estimated for developed countries. Doubling the size of the sector within the
city, that is roughly moving from the first to the ninth decile of the specialisation variable,
increases productivity by almost 4%. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence of
the presence of relatively strong localisation economies for China that arise from within-sector
city externalities, all other city characteristics being controlled for.
4 Explaining the location effect
4.1 Main OLS and IV estimations
Table 4 reports a series of estimations of specification (11) either using OLS or instrumenting
the city characteristics to tackle the endogeneity issues we detailed in section 2.316.
OLS estimations displayed in Columns (1) to (3) highlight a strong and significant impact
of local employment density on individual earnings. As shown in Column (1), the estimated
elasticity is about 0.10 when introduced alone in the specification. Columns (2) and (3) add
local variables contained in U˜c that include land area, the Herfindhal diversity index, market
potential and distance to the closest seaport. Whereas land area and market potential are
both significant at one percent level neither the Herfindhal diversity index nor the distance to
the closest seaport is significant17. Employment density remains significant and its estimated
impact is fairly close to the one obtained with no additional control. The impact of density
is higher when land area and diversity are included but it reduces when market potential
and distance to seaport are included. Specification OLS2 thus seems to suffer from a missing
variable problem when market potential is not controlled for, due to the positive correlation
16As some of the instruments are available for 83 cities only, the sample is reduced to these cities for all
the estimations done in the second stage (Table 4 and Table 6). OLS estimates on the whole sample of 87
prefecture-level cities provide very similar results.
17Regarding the diversity index, this is a standard finding when urbanisation economies variables are simul-
taneously introduced in the specification. Moreover, in our case, the sector classification is not much detailed
since we have only 11 sectors. Being computed on a too small number of sectors, our index may not properly
account for the effective industrial diversification, which in turn may affect the significance of the diversity
variable.
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Table 3: Individual wage disparities - OLS estimates for the first stage
Log(wage)
Male 0.252∗∗∗ (0.00992)
Years of education 0.0643∗∗∗ (0.00217)
Experience 0.0398∗∗∗ (0.00162)
Experience squared -0.000838∗∗∗ (0.0000389)
Occupation
Administration staff 0.358∗∗∗ (0.0331)
Prof. and technical staff 0.304∗∗∗ (0.0278)
Office worker or manager 0.169∗∗∗ (0.0262)
Service worker -0.0121 (0.0276)
Unskilled worker 0.0690∗∗ (0.0276)
Enterprise ownership
Urban collective enterprises -0.274∗∗∗ (0.0207)
Private or individual enterprises -0.226∗∗∗ (0.0175)
Other ownership -0.224∗∗∗ (0.0128)
Economic sector
Agriculture, mining 0.162∗∗∗ (0.0397)
Electricity, gas and water 0.238∗∗∗ (0.0328)
Construction 0.0975∗∗∗ (0.0337)
Transport, storage, telecom 0.0926∗∗∗ (0.0194)
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0313 (0.0207)
Finance and insurance 0.253∗∗∗ (0.0330)
Real estate 0.113∗∗∗ (0.0315)
Social services -0.186∗∗∗ (0.0213)
Health, education, culture and research 0.0412∗∗ (0.0177)
Government and party agencies 0.0329∗ (0.0186)
Specialization 0.0552∗∗∗ (0.0103)
City dummies Yes
N 14,590
adj. R2 0.442
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Reference groups: for occupation: other occupation (including soldiers); for
enterprise ownership: state-owned enterprises; for economic sector: manufac-
turing.
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between density and market potential on the one hand, and between market potential and
wages on the other hand (see Appendix C).
Table 4: The determinants of city effects - OLS and IV estimates for the second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
Density 0.099∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038)
Land area 0.176∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.058)
Diversity −0.027 0.084 0.008 0.017 0.008 −0.024
(0.170) (0.162) (0.186) (0.178) (0.172) (0.174)
Market potential 0.381∗∗∗ 0.106 0.116 0.225
(0.109) (0.141) (0.132) (0.155)
Distance to seaport −0.010 −0.020 −0.018 −0.010
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Instruments:
Peripherality Y Y N N N
Historic city N N Y Y Y
Distance to historic N N Y Y Y
Manufacturing share Y Y Y N Y
Services share N N N Y N
Henderson industries N Y Y N N
Henderson occupations N N N N Y
Doctors share N N N Y Y
R2 0.18 0.39 0.48
Hansen p-value 0.623 0.955 0.849 0.879 0.214
Cragg-Donald 33.8 18.1 16.3 24.9 5.1
1st Shea part. R2, den 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.58 0.57
1st part. Fisher, den 33.84 13.04 12.69 25.40 14.52
1st Shea part. R2, mp 0.60 0.68 0.51
1st part. Fisher, mp 5.28 40.01 7.82
1st Shea part. R2, area 0.34
1st part. Fisher, area 6.05
Notes: 83 observations for each regression. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. In
columns (4) and (5), employment density only is instrumented. In columns (6) and (7), employment density and market
potential are instrumented. In column (8), employment density, market potential and land area are instrumented. The
instruments are: the logarithm of the average distance of any city to all cities (peripherality), the logarithm of the average
distance to historic cities (distance to historic), a dummy for historic major cities (historic city), the logarithm of the
share of manufacturing in total employment in 1990 (manufacturing share), the logarithm of the share of services in total
employment in 1990 (services share), the share of doctors in the population in 1990 (doctors share), the Henderson index
for sectors (Henderson industries), the Henderson index for occupation (Henderson occupations).
As for urbanisation economies other than density, a remarkable finding concerns land
area that is usually not found to significantly impact productivity in Western countries when
included together with density. In China, further gains from increasing the city land area,
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keeping density constant, would exist. The important role of land area also appears through
the R2 that more than doubles when area is introduced, which is not the case for Western
countries.
Finally, the estimated elasticity of market potential (0.38) is close to what is usually
found in Western countries, and it leads to a further 9 percentage point increase in the R2.
Hence, OLS results indicate that access to other cities matters for local productivity, which
could reflect either better trade opportunities or technological spillovers from neighbouring
cities. Note that such an effect cannot be directly compared to the positive impact of market
potential obtained in structural estimations by Au and Henderson (2006) and Hering and
Poncet (2010) because their variable includes both the own city size and other cities’ size
whereas our approach disentangles the two and excludes the own city size from the market
potential variable. Our OLS estimates conclude to a positive impact of both components. By
contrast, the proximity to seaports, which could reflect a better access to international export
opportunities, does not have any significant effect. Again, this cannot be directly compared
with Hering and Poncet (2010) who include international markets within their single market
potential variable but it is consistent with Au and Henderson (2006) who also conclude to
a non-significant role of the access to sea. Moreover, as we control for firm ownership (and
foreign ownership in particular) in the first step of the estimation and for the effect of many
other local variables in the second step -all variables strongly correlated to the distance to
seaport-, it is not surprising that this counterbalances the negative uni-dimensional impact of
lack of access to sea (see Appendix C). Only a multi-variate approach as ours allows not to
misinterpret the correlation between productivity and access to sea.
Columns (4) to (8) display IV regression results for different specifications and variants on
the instruments used. IV1 considers density only as an explanatory (instrumented) variable.
If instruments are valid, it should be enough to get the correct elasticity for the impact of
density. Several diagnostic tests are used to ascertain the validity of the instruments. In
general the difficulty lies in finding exogenous instruments. Here, over-identification tests
are passed according to the Hansen p-value and instruments are not weak given the Cragg-
Donald statistics18 at 33.8 and the high first-stage partial R2. The elasticity of employment
density slightly decreases by comparison with OLS1. This is consistent with usual findings
for Western countries and with the presence of reverse causality and/or missing variables
that slightly bias OLS estimates. IV2 controls for both land area and diversity, with density
only being instrumented. This implies that land area is also used as an instrument. There
are debates on that point. Typically, if one thinks that local or central authorities react to
the expansion of cities by increasing their spatial extent, land area may well be endogenous
too. However, Ciccone (2002) and a number of followers argue that area is a licit instrument.
18Equal to the Fisher test since there is for the moment only one instrumented variable.
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This is what estimation IV2 does too. Instruments still pass over-identification and weak
instruments tests. The density elasticity increases quite significantly. The positive impact of
land area on wages, and the absence of a diversity effect, found in OLS are confirmed.
The conclusions still hold when market potential is introduced in the specification and is
instrumented. If one thinks that density is endogenous, market potential, which corresponds to
density in neighbouring regions, might be endogenous too. We provide two sets of regressions
that instrument both density and market potential (IV3 and IV4). They should provide
consistent estimates for two different sets of instruments since both the over-identification and
weak instrument tests are passed. Instrumenting leaves the elasticities of density and land
area almost unaffected with respect to column IV2. However, by comparison with column
OLS3, the market potential impact is not significant any more. This is an important result.
It is actually fairly difficult to identify separately the effect of density and market potential
because these variables are pretty much correlated (the correlation coefficient amounts to
0.55, see Appendix C). OLS would conclude that both variables impact wages significantly.
However, the IV3 estimation shows that the market potential effect must be attributed to
density, whose real effect is higher than it appears in OLS1 or OLS3 for instance. Importantly,
one should note that the non-significance of market potential in IV3 and IV4 is not due to
a too imprecise estimation but rather to a decrease in the magnitude of the effect. The IV
standard error is close to the OLS one but the elasticity of market potential decreases by a
factor of more than 3. Hence, market potential would not matter for local productivity in
China. This is not in contradiction with results from Au and Henderson (2006) and Hering
and Poncet (2010) since their market potential includes both the own city size and other
cities’ size. When the two are disentangled, first by using two different variables, second by
instrumenting, only the own city size seems to matter.19
Finally, to relax the exogeneity assumption for land area (even when over-identification
and weak instruments tests are passed), we instrument all three variables (density, land area
and market potential) simultaneously in column IV5. Density and market potential effects are
very close to those obtained in columns IV3 and IV4, and the area effect gets larger. The over-
identification test is passed but instruments are a bit weak. This may not be surprising given
that instrumenting the three variables simultaneously is very demanding. First, area usually
expands when density does but its variations present more inertia over time. Finding variables
that instrument both correctly and are not weak is not easy in that case. Furthermore, and
generally speaking, many econometricians find the simultaneous instrumentation of more
than two variables a bit doubtful and difficult to interpret even when tests are passed. Given
19Although city growth and not productivity in China is studied by Chen and Partridge (2011), which
corresponds to different underlying mechanisms, our conclusion is consistent with their findings of a positive
effect of market access to medium-sized cities but a negative effect for the market access to mega-cities.
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these various points of view, we are somewhat agnostic about the fact that area should be
instrumented or not. In any case, regressions that do or do not instrument area simultaneously
with density and market potential (IV3, IV4 and IV5) all lead to very similar conclusions.
The elasticity of employment density is about 0.12, the elasticity for land area is at least 0.17,
possibly a bit higher, whereas diversity, access to sea, and market potential are not significant.
These findings imply that agglomeration economies would be more localized in China than in
Western countries: the own-city density matters more, and own-area matters also, while the
size of neighbouring cities matters less.
At about 0.12, the estimated elasticity for local employment density is three times higher
than in Western countries for similar specifications, implying that the doubling of density
would increase individual wages of any worker by 8.7%. Another interesting point is that the
dispersion of density is also much larger in China than in Western countries. A worker moving
from a city at the first quartile (decile, respectively) of density to a city at the third quartile
(last decile, respectively) would experience a wage gain of 27% (53%) respectively. The same
figures for France for instance would be around 2.5% and 5%, respectively, both because the
density elasticity is lower (at 0.03) and because inter-deciles and quartiles are around 10 times
lower.
The estimated coefficient of about 0.17 for land area means that if we compare two cities
with the same employment density, but one 20% larger than the other, workers in the largest
city gain 3.2% more than workers in the smallest city. A direct implication of this finding is
that labour productivity could be improved in China by simultaneously increasing the density
and the physical size of cities. For example, if the population of a city was increased by 50%
with its land area simultaneously expanded by 20%, the wage gain for workers would be about
6.4%. Though not directly comparable with Au and Henderson (2006) due to the presence of
a non-log linear effect of city size in their specification and a structural approach, the order
of magnitude of agglomeration economies is rather similar in both studies, at least as regards
the part of their curve where productivity is increasing with city size, which regards 90% of
the cities in their sample.
4.2 Further robustness tests
To assess the robustness of the magnitude of the estimated impact of density, we supplement
the analysis with another individual database. The data used in this section come from a
nationally representative household income survey for the year 2002, which is part of the
China Household Income Project (CHIP)20. The main advantage of using these data is that
20The China Household Income Project is an internationally joint research project established in 1987, and
coordinated by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with assistance from the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It includes three waves: 1988, 1995, and 2002 that have been widely used
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the survey provides a more complete measure for individual wages. The main weakness of the
database is that the number of cities is much reduced compared to the 2007 database, which
does not allow us to provide a comprehensive set of tests. In particular, as explained below,
we stick to OLS estimations only and confirm that they are fully consistent with OLS results
from 2007.
The CHIP-2002 urban survey includes 6,835 households and 20,632 individuals in 12
provinces (Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi,
Chongqing, Sichuan, and Yunnan). As compared to the 2007 NBS dataset, it covers fewer
provinces, and fewer prefecture-level cities as well since only 49 prefecture-level cities are
surveyed, though most cities included in the 2002 survey are also included in the 2007 survey.
Earnings and working time are documented in great detail in the CHIP-2002 data, which
makes it possible to account for location differences in working time as well as in non-
productivity compensation payments. Regarding earnings, cash labour compensations are
divided into several categories that distinguish the basic salary from bonuses, allowances and
subsidies paid by the work unit21. Regarding working time, the number of declared hours
worked in a year reported in the survey enables us to compute hourly wages. Four differ-
ent dependent variables are thus considered to assess the importance of not controlling for
work hours or for non-productivity compensation payments for the 2007 estimations. As a
reference, the first dependent variable is the log of total annual earnings defined in the same
way as in the 2007 database. Then, we consider only the (still annual) basic wage paid to
workers, which excludes all sorts of benefits paid by the work unit. Finally, we account for
working time by considering the hourly earnings/wage instead of the annual earnings/wage.
We replicate the two-stage empirical strategy presented in section 2.1 on the 2002 database.
In a first stage, equation (4) is estimated on 2002 individual wage data through ols. In a
second stage, equation (11) is estimated on 2002 city-level variables, defined in a way strictly
similar to 2007. The estimation results for the first stage are reported in Appendix D for
reference.22 Table 5 reproduces estimation results that are comparable with Columns OLS2
and OLS3 in Table 4, with four different dependent variables used in the first stage.
A rapid comparison of the estimated coefficients across the four columns highlights very
stable results, which indicates that the bias brought by the use of annual earnings instead
of basic salary and/or hourly compensation should not be too severe to the extent that
it contaminates our results. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates for the location variables
to investigate income inequality in China. For the year 2002, a detailed description of the survey can be found
in Li, Luo, Wei and Yue (2008).
21A description of the various categories of these benefits can be found in De´murger et al. (2007).
22All explanatory variables are defined consistently with 2007 for both steps. The only exception is for
enterprise ownership, which contains two additional categories not included in the 2007 classification: foreign-
invested firms and government agencies. Foreign-invested firms are implicitly included in the ‘other ownership’
category in 2007, while government agencies are implicitly included in the state-owned enterprises category.
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Table 5: Individual wage disparities, 2002 - OLS estimates for the second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEP1 DEP2 DEP3 DEP4 DEP1 DEP2 DEP3 DEP4
Density 0.122∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.0976∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0482) (0.0355) (0.0364) (0.0500) (0.0503) (0.0379) (0.0386)
Land area 0.102∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.0735∗∗ 0.0814∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.0825∗∗ 0.0949∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0460) (0.0338) (0.0347) (0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0392) (0.0399)
Diversity 0.116 0.176 0.108 0.169 0.105 0.167 0.106 0.168
(0.201) (0.204) (0.150) (0.154) (0.203) (0.205) (0.154) (0.157)
Market potential 0.242 0.294 0.115 0.166
(0.207) (0.209) (0.157) (0.160)
Distance to seaport -0.0265 -0.0274 -0.00742 -0.00893
(0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0351) (0.0357)
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
R2 0.164 0.188 0.196 0.225 0.202 0.238 0.208 0.248
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. DEP1 to DEP4 refer to 4 different
dependent variables for the first stage, as follows: DEP1 is for Log(earnings); DEP2 is for Log(hourly earnings);
DEP3 is for Log(wage); DEP4 is for Log(hourly wage).
remain of comparable magnitude, though a bit smaller, as compared to estimations provided in
Table 4. More precisely, the wage elasticity with respect to employment density is consistently
close to 0.12, although variations can be observed across regressions, notably between earnings
(DEP1 and DEP2) and wages (DEP3 and DEP4). Hence, taking into account non ‘pure’ wage
compensations paid by the work unit reduces the elasticity of wage with respect to employment
density by 11 to 14 percent. In comparison, taking into account the working time does not
alter much the results, as shown in the comparison between DEP1 and DEP2, as well as
between DEP3 and DEP4.
Two other results deserve additional comments. First, regarding the impact of land area,
the estimated amplitude is smaller than in 2007, and more importantly, while it is not much
affected by working time differences, it is particularly reduced when ‘pure’ wage is used as a
dependent variable. The reduction in the estimated effect is bigger than for the employment
density, at about 27 to 31 percent. Second, the impact of market potential on wage differentials
is not only reduced in amplitude but it also becomes non-significant for both earnings and wage
variables. Distance to seaport remains not significant either. Therefore, as for 2007 we find
that access to other cities and to international markets is not a cause of higher productivity
in Chinese cities.
To sum up, the aforementioned robustness checks with 2002 data indicate that the ampli-
tude of the density effect is remarkably stable over the various definitions of wages, which gives
credit to our measured elasticity with respect to density of about 0.12 for 2007, around 20%
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higher than the one estimated for 2002. These findings suggest that not only agglomeration
economies matter in China but they also seem to have been reinforcing over recent years.
5 The migration externality
The extent to which internal migration contributes to local residents’ productivity is another
contribution of the paper. As described in section 2.2, we measure this contribution by
estimating specification (9) where the (logarithm of the inverse of 1 minus the) local share
of migrants is introduced in the specification together with the density of local residents’
employment and other urbanisation effects. Results are provided in Table 6, which displays
both OLS and IV estimations as a parallel to Table 4.
Before discussing the estimation results, the definition of the local share of migrants de-
serves some comments. Aggregate data available at the city level account for officially regis-
tered population only, which we loosely refer as “natives”, and rural migrants are set aside.
Since official figures including non-registered urban residents are not available, we resort to
the 1% Population Census issued in 2005 to compute the share of the migrant population in
cities. The rural migrants are defined as working individuals aged 16 to 60 who are not living
in the same county as their county of Hukou registration23.
Column (1) in Table 6 introduces employment density and the migrant share only in an
OLS estimation. Both variables exhibit a highly significant positive effect, which suggests that
on top of employment density the presence of rural migrants creates a positive externality that
increases the wages of all (native) workers. As expected from the derivations in section 2.2, the
elasticity of density is now lower than when the role of migration was not considered since it
does not encompass anymore the positive externality of migrants. This clearly appears when
one compares (9), where the elasticity of density is β, to (11), where it is β + (β + λ)ρ > β
even if one ignores the reverse causality role of expected wages.24 One also needs ρ > 0, ie
migrants are indeed attracted by city amenities beyond the expected wage, which is confirmed
empirically.
Columns (2) and (3) go on to incorporate additional local variables in a way similar to
what is done in Table 4. Column (2) confirms that assessing simultaneously the role of land
area increases the density elasticity. Land area has a positive impact on wages but it is
lower compared to estimations that do not assess the role of migrants separately. The same
reasoning as for density holds. If city amenities that attract migrants are correlated to both
density and land area, which is consistent with the positive correlation between these two
23The duration of migration can also be added in the definition of a migrant. The standard definition from
the NBS is to consider only individuals who have resided in the city for at least 6 months. Yet, adding this
time dimension does not affect our results.
24If we do not assume φ = 0, the gap is even larger.
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Table 6: The migration externality - OLS and IV estimates for the second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Density 0.046∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Migrants 0.369∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.097) (0.084) (0.069) (0.077)
Land area 0.100∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Diversity −0.072 −0.014 −0.209 −0.132 −0.130 −0.124
(0.133) (0.135) (0.157) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151)
Market potential 0.182∗ 0.082 0.086 0.078
(0.096) (0.119) (0.114) (0.116)
Distance to seaport −0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Instruments:
Peripherality N N N Y Y N Y
Historic city N N N Y Y Y Y
Distance to historic N N N Y Y Y Y
Manufacturing share N N N N Y Y Y
Non-agr. empl. share N N N Y N Y Y
R2 0.57 0.63 0.65
Hansen p-value 0.585 0.457 0.454 0.469
Cragg-Donald 4.1 7.1 10.8 5.9
1st Shea part. R2, den 0.58 0.48 0.48 0.49
1st part. Fisher, den 18.49 15.97 16.08 14.95
1st Shea part. R2, mig 0.21 0.29 0.43 0.35
1st part. Fisher, mig 4.13 7.30 12.97 6.49
1st Shea part. R2, mp 0.65
1st part. Fisher, mp 31.90
Notes: 83 observations for each regression. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In columns (4), (5) and (6), employment density and the share of rural migrants are instrumented. In column (7),
employment density, the share of rural migrants and market potential are instrumented. The instruments are: the
logarithm of the average distance of any city to all cities (peripherality), the logarithm of the average distance to
historic cities (distance to historic), a dummy for historic major cities (historic city), the logarithm of the share of
manufacturing in total employment in 1990 (manufacturing share), and the share of non-agricultural employment in
total employment in 1990 (non-ag. empl. share).
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variables and the migrant share reported in Appendix C, the elasticity of these two variables
is larger when migrants are omitted from the specification.
Interestingly, OLS estimates reported in Column (3) conclude to a small but significant
impact of both external market potential and the distance to the closest seaport. Finally,
one can note that the inclusion of the migration externality largely increases the explanatory
power of the model, by almost 40 percentage points in the specification with density only,
by 17 percentage points in the complete specification. All variables together explain about
two-third of the city effects, which is very similar to what is found for Western countries.
However, for these countries, almost all the explanatory power comes from density only.
Columns (4) to (7) present IV estimations. As shown in specifications IV1 to IV3, the
simultaneous instrumentation of employment density and the share of migrants does not
affect much the migrants’ and area’s impacts but largely increases the impact of density by
comparison with OLS specifications (OLS2 and OLS3). Looking at (9), this corresponds to
either a reverse causality effect similar to the role played by parameter φ but when migrants
take their migration decision on the exact wage proposed in the city (i.e. including the
random component), or to missing city variables that increase productivity (public goods
for instance). The estimated elasticity is now much closer to the magnitude found for the
specifications without migrants. As explained above, the remaining difference between the
two is consistent with a positive externality arising from the presence of migrants. This is
confirmed by the elasticity of the migrant variable itself since, according to (9), the pure
migrant externality effect corresponds to the difference between the density and the migrant
elasticities. Because the effect of the migrant variable is not only positive but significantly
larger than the density elasticity, our estimations show evidence of a positive externality of
migrants on natives’ productivity.
When market potential and the distance to the closest seaport are controlled for (spec-
ifications IV2 to IV4), both turn to a non-significant impact, as it was the case in the IV
specifications without a separate effect for migrants. The elasticities of employment density
and of the migrant share are slightly reduced compared to specification IV1 but the latter re-
mains significantly larger. The estimated area elasticity is not affected by the introduction of
market potential and distance to seaport controls. The quality of the instruments for columns
IV2 and IV3 is decent, both in terms of over-identification and weak instruments tests, with-
out being exceptional. Instruments are a bit weak. This is particularly true in column IV4
that simultaneously instruments market potential together with density and migrant share
but results remain very similar to those obtained for specifications IV2 and IV3. Again, the
comments we made in section 4 about the difficulty to instrument this type of specifications
apply here since the migrant variable is also instrumented. The overall consistence of our re-
sults across various OLS and IV estimations makes us confident that we evaluate the correct
29
order of magnitude for the impact of both agglomeration and migrant variables.
To sum up, the overall impact of employment density, including the migrant externality is
estimated at 0.12 and the estimated impact of land area is about 0.17 in that case. When mi-
grants externalities are controlled for separately in the specification, both effects are reduced,
at about 0.10 for density and 0.12 for area, and the separate impact of migrants is about 0.32.
Hence, when estimations do not consider the role of migrants separately, about 15% of the
density elasticity and 30% of the area elasticity are due to the migration externality. Going
back to (9), our estimations indicate that β = 0.10 and that the pure migrant externality
λ = 0.32 − 0.10 = 0.22. From that, one may compute the productivity gain from increased
migration. If new migrants move to a city at a constant number of local residents and if
this move increases their share in total employment from the first quartile (decile respec-
tively) of the distribution across Chinese cities to the last quartile (decile respectively), then
productivity in the city increases by 10.0% (33.0% respectively). Two-third of that number
comes from the externality exerted by migrants and one third results from agglomeration
effects induced by the increase in total employment generated by the migrant inflow. On the
other hand, if migrants replace natives in local employment, thus keeping total employment
density constant, the productivity of natives increases by 6.8% (21.6% respectively) just by
the externality effect. Even in that situation, migrants exert a large positive impact on local
wages.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a large literature on agglomeration economies by investigating
urbanisation and migration externalities in China. China is an interesting case study because
urbanisation has long been regulated by administrative means but rural labour mobility has
been sharply accelerating during the 2000s, feeding urbanisation and concomitantly raising
concerns on the potential impact of migrant inflows on local residents’ outcomes. Therefore,
evaluating the magnitude of agglomeration economies and the role that migration plays in
the process is a crucial step to assess the degree to which the Chinese population is efficiently
distributed over the territory and the possible scope for regional policy in China.
Using 2007 microeconomic data from the National Bureau of Statistics, we find that
location matters a lot for urban workers’ wages. Even after controlling for individual and
firms characteristics and instrumenting city characteristics, the elasticity of wage with respect
to employment density is about three times larger than in Western countries. Land area and
specialisation also play a significant role whereas the access to other cities’ markets or to
seaports does not. Therefore, large agglomeration economies prevail in China and they are
more localised than in Western countries. Moreover, we find evidence of a significant and
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large positive impact of the local share of migrants on local workers’ wages. Hence, migration
not only increases productivity through the increase of employment density it leads to, but
also because migrants exert a positive externality on local workers’ wages.
Overall, our estimates support Henderson (2009)’s statement on ‘too many cities with
too few people’ in China based on evidence for the mid-1990s and they indicate that there
is still room for urban areas to further expand. The accelerating urbanisation pace that is
being observed since the early 2000s in China is contributing to filling the gap. However, a
related and highly debated issue in China remains opened on the optimal size of the future
cities: should the expansion of already existing mega-cities or the development of medium-
sized cities be favoured? What our findings suggest is that in 2007, there were potentially
high efficiency losses due to a too strong dispersion of the population and that in comparison
with 2002, agglomeration economies had not been fading out significantly despite a growing
flow of rural-to-urban migration.
Regarding migration policies, our findings on migration externalities add another evidence
of rural migrants’ contribution to the country’s economic growth and industrialisation. They
support the hypothesis of a complementarity (rather than a crowding out) that migrants bring
in to local workers, which is fully consistent with rural migrants being mainly concentrated
in low-end labour-intensive industries that feed other local industries, thus contributing to an
overall improvement of urban productivity.
Beyond the overall large estimated impact of employment density on urban productivity,
there may be heterogeneous effects of agglomeration across individuals depending on skills,
occupations, gender, etc. Heterogeneity in the effect of place-based externalities on individual
earnings is not covered in the paper but in terms of optimal local economic structure, there
is potential for future research along such lines. Furthermore, whether spatial concentration
increases individual welfare is not under study here either. To evaluate that, one should also
estimate how the cost of living increases with city size and compare the productivity gains
we exhibit to these costs. The literature on that topic is only burgeoning, even for Western
countries, but it is clearly another interesting direction to explore for China.
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APPENDIX
A Kernel density estimates for employment density
Figure 3: Kernel density estimates for employment density
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008).
B First stage variance analysis
Table 7 presents a full variance decomposition of the first step estimation reported in Table 3.
It consists in computing, for each worker, the effect of a set of variables (by summing over
the variables the estimated parameter times the value of the variable), and then the variance
of this effect across all individuals and its correlation with the dependent variable. These
computations allow measuring the explanatory power of each set of variables as well as its
correlation with the other sets, so as to assess to what extent the observed effects are inter-
twined. Unsurprisingly, individual characteristics have the highest explanatory power. Their
standard deviation (0.30) is half that of wages (0.75) and their correlation with wages (0.5)
is the highest among all the effects (except residuals). Of particular interest here, city fixed
effects also have a substantial explanatory power: the set of city dummies comes second af-
ter individual characteristics, with a similar standard deviation and a correlation with wages
slightly lower. Sector dummies explain less than location, but ownership is fairly important.
This fully corroborates the conclusions presented in section 3.
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Table 7: Summary statistics for the variance decomposition
Mean St. dev. Simple correlation with lwage
log wage 9.780 0.745 1
Effect of:
Individual characteristics 1.477 0.303 0.497∗∗∗
Sector dummies 0.0268 0.0969 0.243∗∗∗
Enterprise ownership -0.102 0.115 0.285∗∗∗
Location variables 8.378 0.315 0.398∗∗∗
Among which:
City dummies 8.490 0.314 0.398∗∗∗
Localisation effect -0.112 0.0381 0.00441
Residuals 1.12e-10 0.555 0.744∗∗∗
N 14,590
Notes: The variance decomposition is based on estimation displayed in Table 3 column
(1). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
C Pairwise correlation coefficients for local variables and wage
Table 8: Pairwise correlation coefficients for local variables and wage
Wage Employment Area Diversity Market Distance to Migrant
density potential seaport share
Wage 1
Employment density 0.37∗∗∗ 1
Area 0.25∗ -0.43∗∗∗ 1
Diversity 0.22∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.08 1
Market potential 0.43∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ -0.24∗ 0.06 1
Distance to seaport -0.33∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.19 -0.38∗∗∗ 1
Migrant share 0.71∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.18 0.26∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗ 1
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The migrant share variable is defined consistently with the description given
in section 2.2. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
35
D Robustness checks with 2002 data
Table 9: Robustness checks with 2002 data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(earnings) Log(hourly earnings) Log(wage) Log(hourly wage)
Male 0.141∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0730∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0150)
Years of education 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00315) (0.00322) (0.00336)
Experience 0.0436∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(0.00258) (0.00270) (0.00277) (0.00289)
Experience squared -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007)
Occupation
Administration staff 0.377∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.0565) (0.0597) (0.0607) (0.0639)
Prof. and technical staff 0.311∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0547) (0.0578) (0.0587) (0.0619)
Office worker or manager 0.228∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0563) (0.0571) (0.0603)
Service worker -0.00806 -0.0260 -0.0307 -0.0436
(0.0567) (0.0600) (0.0609) (0.0643)
Unskilled worker 0.0344 0.0221 -0.0143 -0.0227
(0.0560) (0.0593) (0.0602) (0.0635)
Enterprise ownership
Urban collective enterprises -0.183∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0265) (0.0271) (0.0282)
Private or individual enterprises -0.135∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.0615∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0218)
Foreign enterprises 0.183∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.0405) (0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0454)
Government administration 0.112∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0244) (0.0250) (0.0261)
Economic sector
Agriculture, mining 0.0654 0.100∗∗ 0.0114 0.0449
(0.0479) (0.0501) (0.0511) (0.0533)
Electricity, gas and water 0.307∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0441) (0.0461) (0.0472) (0.0492)
Construction 0.0459 0.0705 0.0157 0.0368
(0.0441) (0.0461) (0.0472) (0.0491)
Transport, storage, telecom 0.187∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0315) (0.0322) (0.0336)
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0379 -0.0328 -0.0623∗ -0.0597∗
(0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0330) (0.0344)
Finance and insurance 0.180∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.0488) (0.0512) (0.0522) (0.0545)
Real estate 0.160∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.128∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.0656) (0.0683) (0.0712) (0.0739)
Social services -0.140∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.0299) (0.0312) (0.0320) (0.0333)
(Continued on next page)
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Health, education, 0.153∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
culture and research (0.0284) (0.0297) (0.0304) (0.0317)
Government and party 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0564 0.0909∗∗
agencies (0.0331) (0.0346) (0.0355) (0.0370)
Specialization 0.0143 0.0318∗∗ 0.000973 0.0179
(0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0153)
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,536 7,469 7,443 7,376
adj. R2 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.29
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. In this Table, earnings refer to total
wage compensation, including subsidies, and wage refers to basic wage, excluding all kinds of subsidies. Hourly
earnings and wages are calculated by dividing the annual amount by the effective working time reported by
workers. Reference groups: for occupation: other occupation (including soldiers); for education level: primary
school or below; for enterprise ownership: state-owned enterprises; for economic sector: manufacturing.
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